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The effectiveness of contemporary Geographical Indications (GIs) schemes in enhancing the 
quality of Chinese agrifoods — Experiences from the field 
 
Abstract: Food quality problems have frequently been in the news in China leading to growing 
concerns amongst consumers. Within this context, Geographical Indications (GIs), as an indicator 
of quality, are becoming increasingly important in the Chinese agrifood market. However, in the 
face of a number of GI agrifood scandals reported in the last decade, the effectiveness of 
contemporary Chinese GI schemes in terms of enhancing agrifood quality is becoming 
questionable. To discover the underlying reasons for this, the paper first provides an overview of 
Chinese GI schemes and conceptualises ‘agrifood quality’ using ideas drawn from socio-economic 
theory and network approaches, with a particular focus on the role of power relationships. It then 
applies the conceptual framework to case studies examining quality forming processes in three GI 
networks in Jiangxi Province. The research indicates that the development of Chinese GI networks 
is driven primarily by the government’s intention to increase farmers’ and rural incomes, and that 
the GI schemes examined in this study are characterised by low or basic standards, inappropriate 
GI issuing procedures and weak government quality inspection programmes. Therefore, the 
overall conclusion is that the quality of Chinese agrifood products may not be enhanced by GI 
schemes as currently implemented.  
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The Shanghai Institute for Food and Drug Safety (2012) reported that more than 70% of Shanghai 
residents worry about domestically produced food, with the quality of meat and dairy products of 
most concern. Fears and scares are also common with many Chinese cases receiving attention in 
the Western press. Among the most notable examples include the industrial chemical melamine in 
powdered milk in 2008, illegal additives in some soft drinks in 2011 and, more recently, concerns 
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over genetically modified rice products. In short, the perceived quality of a wide portfolio of 
Chinese agrifood products has warranted a great degree of comment both in China and in many 
developed countries, especially those where Chinese agrifood products are exported to. 
 
These recent incidents concerning agrifood safety have generated a wider interest in the overall 
quality of agrifoods in China and particularly in mechanisms for assuring traceability in food 
chains. In fact, it is the government’s responsibility to define the legally acceptable composition of 
agrifood products to protect the public from poor quality and diseased foodstuffs (Barling, 2004). 
However, the effectiveness of the Chinese food regulatory system has been criticised for a number 
of reasons, such as lax standards, unclear responsibility between different regulatory departments 
and a lack of an effective tracing and recalling system (Brogaard and Zhao, 2002; Tam and Yang 
2005; Calvin et al., 2006; Roberts and Engardio, 2006; Roth et al., 2008). Within this context, the 
question of how to enhance the quality of Chinese agrifoods is becoming not only a topic of 
significant political debate but also an area requiring increasing research focus and analysis.  
 
Chinese history and custom may offer a potential solution. Dating back as early as 2000 B.C., the 
Chinese have developed specific ways to judge agrifood quality (Liu, 2006). They believe that 
agrifood products planted in certain places possess unique natural qualities which shape the 
foundations of self-medication, personal health and disease prevention (Reid et al., 2001). Many 
particular foods thus form an essential element of Chinese food ‘therapy’. Drawing upon this 
traditional Chinese approach, the symbolism associated with a geographic location has caught the 
imagination and interest of contemporary consumers. Consequently Geographical Indications (GIs) 
may convey assumed ‘local’ (traceability) and ‘natural’ (nutritiousness and safety) characteristics 
therebye acting as proxies for quality especially given that the accreditation process follows a 
defined code of practice (see also Parrott et al., 2002).  
 
But, is this pathway an effective method to enhance agrifood quality within the Chinese food 
regulatory system? Unfortunately, many sub-standard GI agrifood products have been reported in 
the media over the last decade. Pesticide poisoned Jinhua ham, illegally dyed Baiyangdian duck 
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eggs, and concerns over the level of residue from pesticide-lined bags used on young Yantai 
apples to shield the fruit from blemishes from pollution and pests are three high profile examples. 
To discover the underlying reasons for these problems and thus to evaluate the ability of 
contemporary Chinese GI schemes to enhance agrifood quality, this paper first examines the 
Chinese GI system and explores the meaning of agrifood quality. Then, following a discussion of 
the research methodology, the paper draws upon three cases studies which assess the effectiveness 
of GIs with respect to agrifood quality for oranges, mandarins, and green tea before concluding 
with its results.  
 
2. The GI system and the Chinese Context 
 
GIs, according to Article 22.1 in the ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)’, are defined as, ‘indications which identify a good as originating in the 
territory of a member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or 
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin’. In theory, 
producers are expected to club or co-operate together to apply for GI recognition from the 
government based on pre-agreed GI certification criteria. Anybody located in the specific area and 
making products conforming to the requirements of the certification process, has the right to apply 
to use GI labels on their products. To ensure specific characteristics further, not only has a product 
to meet all the specified GI criteria before being permitted to use a GI, but also a government 
department and/or independent third party should inspect production processes and thus guarantee 
the conformity of actors to official norms (O’Reilly and Hains, 2004; Hayes et al., 2004, 2005; 
The Parma Ham Consortium, 2007). Under such structures, GIs can be used as tangible signals of 
specified quality characteristics by producing groups or organisations (Allaire, 2004). 
 
However, this system may contain two main flaws in securing ‘high’ quality. Firstly, the process 
of establishing codes of practice for GIs involves different individuals and groups, and the actual 
setting of the minimum acceptable GI standard may thus itself be the outcome of a bargaining 
process and the emergence of a compromise solution where ‘low’ or ‘basic’ GI criteria are adopted 
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(Anania and Nisticò, 2004). Membership heterogeneity may negatively affect GI standards for that 
very reason (Dentoni et al., 2012). Secondly, GIs are owned by groups or organisations (Hayes et. 
al, 2005). Comparable to some quasi-public products, there is a reduced incentive for individual 
producers to invest in improving the collective reputation of GIs if the reward is shared by every 
GI user irrespective of their initial investment of time or resource. When the higher quality GI 
producers realise they cannot acquire additional rewards for their extra costs and efforts, the effect 
may be that higher quality producers may exit the market with the result that average or low 
quality GI products may then dominate, a scenario that may emerge especially with lax market 
supervision (Akerlof, 1970). These two weaknesses demonstrate that the modern GI system per se 
is not a necessary and sufficient precondition for enhancing the quality of GI agrifood products. 
The effectiveness of GI schemes upon quality will vary according to the specific context. 
   
Geographical names have been used for thousands of years to distinguish similar products in 
China. However, the Chinese did not establish any regulations to protect and promote 
geographical origins until the 1980s when China became, somewhat belatedly, one of the 
signatories to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) in 1985. Today, 
three parallel legislative frameworks have been established to manage the Chinese GI system. 
Firstly, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) is tasked with defining GIs1 
and managing the GI system under the Trademark Law. Secondly, based on the ‘Provisions on 
Protection of GI Products’ issued in 2005, the Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection 
and Quarantine (AQSIQ) is able to confirm GI recognitions and to monitor and supervise 
production processes of GI products. The third and final GI legislation system is administered by 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) since 2007 which holds the right to register GIs and to 
supervise and examine the usage of GIs through ‘Measures for the Administration of 
Geographical Indications of Agricultural Products’. 
 
These three government departments established three parallel GI frameworks and this generated 
                                                        
1 GIs are defined as collective and certification marks under Trademark Law. 
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potential for conflict to arise not just from different GI standards2 but also from the overlapping 
areas of government inspection. Such ambiguities and confusion created the conditions for 
unscrupulous producers to produce sub-standard GI agrifood products or agrifood products with 
fake GI certifications (Tam and Yang, 2005). In the wake of many Chinese GI agrifood products 
with an ‘unacceptable’ level of quality, the quality influence of GIs which theoretically appear to 
‘guarantee’ that certified agrifood products have met published GI standards and may make ‘food 
supply chains legible, traceable, and perhaps less risky’ (Guthman, 2004, p.512), is questionable 
in China presently. Considering the complicated nature of Chinese GI schemes, and given that 
little similar research has been undertaken, the effectiveness of Chinese GIs is thus becoming an 
important area for research. 
  
3. Conceptualising agrifood quality 
In order to explore the effectiveness of contemporary Chinese GI schemes in ensuring agrifood 
quality, it is necessary to discuss the definition of agrifood quality. Whilst it is clear that food 
safety is a necessary pre-requisite for food quality, the latter is in many ways a more fluid, 
subjective and contested concept than the former. Indeed, providing an all-inclusive definition of 
agrifood quality is challenging.  
 
Firstly, agrifood quality has different meanings in different agrifood systems/networks. For 
example, in the industrial agrifood system, characterised by growing globalisation, agrifood 
quality is primarily shaped by giant agrifood companies and large-scale retailers through 
measurement standards/grades and definitional norms, as ‘standardisation’ is central to large-scale 
industrial production and economic effectiveness (Goodman and Watts, 1997; Heffernan et al., 
1999; Murdoch and Miele, 1999; Renard, 2005). Farmers and most processors have little choice 
but to accept and conform with these specific quality metrics in order to get shelf positions in the 
market (Renard, 2005). Nevertheless, from the late 1980s, Alternative Agrifood Networks 
(AAFNs) began to attract more attention in the world agriculture sector stimulated by food crises 
(such as BSE, Salmonella, chemical contamination and concern over genetically modified 
                                                        
2 Different GI frameworks may adopt different GI standards for a GI product. 
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agrifoods), rising consumer incomes (Morgan and Murdoch, 2000), the ‘squeeze’ on farmers’ and 
processors’ incomes (Fine, 1994; Mitchell et al., 1997; Van der Ploeg et al., 2000), and the 
willingness of many governments to improve incomes in ‘lagging’ rural areas (Ilbery and 
Kneafsey, 1998; Murdoch and Miele, 1999; Marsden et al., 2000; Miele and Murdoch, 2002; 
Marsden and Smith, 2005; Dogan and Gokovali, 2012). To compete with the more standardised, 
industrial approach, the quality meaning in AAFNs is more consumer orientated with its emphasis 
on attributes such as health (e.g. organic products and GMO free products), locality of origin (e.g. 
products with GI labels), animal welfare (e.g. ‘free range’ products), and ecologically friendly 
farming practices (Nygard and Storstad, 1998; Winter, 2003a; 2003b). The emerging GI system 
could thus be viewed as a branch of AAFNs offering possible market entry for ‘localised’ quality 
(see also Storper, 1997; Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1999; Whatmore et al., 2003; DuPuis and Goodman, 
2005). However, this ‘localised’ nature also prevents the establishment of a uniform definition of 
agrifood quality and so a range of specific quality meanings emerge under the umbrella of GI 
products. For example, the quality of Cassis wine is linked to “terroir” and restricted quantity 
whilst that of Florida citrus is related to natural environment and modern technology. 
 
Secondly, quality perspectives are not static for different actors in the agrifood network (e.g. 
farmers, processors, sellers and consumers) and they are also shaped further by the role of 
government, the vagaries of the natural environment, the levels of technology and a variety of 
social-cultural factors. For example, a consumer’s definition of agrifood quality may be linked to 
perceived safety concerns or subjectively to taste whilst in contrast, based on measurable 
characteristics, producers may interpret agrifood quality as primarily the means to develop a 
market or a marketing opportunity to increase sales or set premium prices (Morris and Young, 
2000; Sepúlveda et al., 2010). However, both perspectives are conditional upon the need to 
conform to the government’s quality standards with respect to biological, chemical, and physical 
criteria (i.e. safety) or suffer the risk of being declared ineligible for sale in the market. Many 
agrifood researchers (e.g. Nygard and Storstad, 1998; Henson, 2000; Parrott et al., 2002; Harvey 
et al., 2004；Jumba, 2012; Klockner et al. 2013) have recognised there is a division in agrifood 
quality between producers and consumers, and different factors may provide contrasting prisms 
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through which agrifood quality can be evaluated. Ilbery and Kneafsey (2000, p.219) thus argue 
that agrifood quality ‘is indeed a social construction and thus dependent on the socio-cultural, 
political and economic contexts within which production-consumption relations exist’. Similarly, 
Harvey et al. (2004) and Mansfield (2003a; 2003b) propose that agrifood quality is ‘about 
judgement in contexts’ where contexts are characterised by government and its associated 
regulations, the socio-cultural environment, the economic context as well as producer and 
consumer organisations. As such, actors and contexts collaboratively influence the debate on 
agrifood quality. 
 
In the face of different agrifood quality interpretations accentuated by the nature of different 
systems/networks and given the influences of multiple actors and factors, agrifood quality can 
only be analysed and evaluated within context (see also Parrott et al., 2002). For this reason, this 
research adopts a ‘network’ approach to aid the understanding of how agrifood quality is enhanced 
in the Chinese GI context. Network approaches have been adopted by many scholars (e.g. Hughes, 
2000; Ilbery and Maye, 2005; Tregear et al., 2007) to analyse agricultural activities as well as 
agrifood quality since the 1990s. In contrast to the ‘chain’ approach with its tendency to 
concentrate on economic exchange and treat consumption as an ‘outcome’ of production (Fine, 
1994; Busch and Juska, 1997), network approaches examine ways in which all factors, human and 
non-human entities, are bound together and consequently shape and are shaped by their alliances 
(Atkins and Bowler, 2001). The idea is to explore ‘how different kinds of nodes (people, firms, 
states, places and organization) are connected to one another in complex and multi-stranded ways’ 
(Hughes, 2000, p.178) to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the various activities 
within the agricultural sector.  
 
Based on a network perspective, agrifood quality can be analysed through examining ‘how 
relations amongst people and things might be imagined, assembled and translated to effect 
co-ordination at a distance’ (Larner and Le Heron, 2002, p.417). Developing durable quality in 
the network relies upon ‘strong fabrics of social organisation at all points in the network, making 
the patterning of social and environmental practices in particular times and places integral to the 
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business of network enrolment’ (Whatmore and Thorne, 1997, p.294). Law (1994, p.40) and 
Whatmore and Thorne (1997, p.293-294) use the notion of ‘modes of ordering’ to describe the 
relationships that link producers, various organisations and consumers into a network, and indicate 
that ‘modes of ordering’ are both narrative, namely ‘ways of telling about the world … what used 
to be, or what ought to happen’, and material, ‘acted out and embodied in a concrete, non-verbal, 
manner in a network’. Latour (1987), Morgan and Murdoch (2000) and Morgan et al. (2006) 
stress the importance of ‘power’ in describing such relationships and how actors co-operate or 
otherwise with each other. They define power as a relationship performed through mobilising, 
stabilising and combining people, actions or events to fulfill certain functions in a stable network. 
 
It should be noted that power is ‘a relational effect of social interaction’ (Allen, 2003, p.2). It is a 
consequence rather than a cause of action (Latour, 1987) and should not be considered to reside 
solely in the hands of any one actor (Lockie and Kitto, 2000; Dicken et al., 2001; Csurgó et al., 
2008). Inevitably, actors with certain resources such as knowledge, information and capacities, 
may be in a stronger strategic position to shape power relationships according to their own 
preference. For example, large-scale retailers, holding huge economic buying capacity, may set 
their own quality standards and so shape the whole supply system to conform to those standards. 
But, the distribution of resources alone does not necessarily correspond to the distribution of 
power, nor does it mean that the structure within certain networks can never be changed or that 
actors with an unequal position and with fewer resources and capacities will never have a chance 
to compete for their power (Dahl, 1989). It is because resources and capacities ‘may be modified, 
displaced or disrupted depending upon the relationships that come into play’ (Allen, 2003, p.97). 
As Juska and Busch (1994) and Juska et al. (2000) point out, power is negotiable and is modified 
through time in the network. It is not structurally determined based simply on resources or abilities 
or capacities but remains unstable and conditional upon the interaction and interplay of the set of 
various actors (Lockie, 2002). 
 
Therefore, based on previous research, agrifood quality can only be analysed as the outcome of 
unstable and changing power relationships between various actors within a certain political, 
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economic and social context. Figure 1 below illustrates this point. 
 
Figure 1: The conceptual framework of agrifood quality 
 
Consequently, the focus of this research seeks to understand how power relationships unfold and 
interact between key actors3 within a given context and their final impact upon Chinese GI 
agifood quality. The next section summarises the methodology adopted in this research, which 
aimed to identify not only the key actors but also the power relationships between them. Only then 
can the effectiveness or otherwise of the Chinese GI system be assessed.  
 
4. Methodology: three case studies 
 
More than 1,800 GI agrifood products were registered in China by the end of 2010 (Beijing 
Zhongjunshiji GIs Research Team, 2011). The focus of this research is on Jiangxi Province, which 
has 67 registered GI products, a figure slightly higher than the average of 64 GIs per province. The 
region was chosen primarily on practical grounds, being the location of the lead author’s home 
institution. Nevertheless, the case meets the condition stressed by Stake (2005) that whatever 
cases are chosen should offer the opportunity to maximise what can be learned. 
                                                        
3 Key actors involved in GI networks may vary under different research purposes and contexts. For example, 
according to Murdoch (2000), not only the agriculture sector but also the non-agriculture sphere, such as the tourist 
industry and more general economic aspects, should be addressed when focusing on European rural development 
to analyse GI networks. As this paper concentrates on Chinese GI agrifood quality, only power relationships 
between the key agrifood actors involved in quality forming processes are examined.  
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To choose suitable sample cases from the 67 GI products within Jiangxi Province, a scoping study 
involving 4 agricultural researchers from Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics and 
Jiangxi Agricultural University and 12 GI consumers was undertaken in early 2010. All the 
respondents were interviewed to develop criteria for selecting case studies: firstly, the sample 
cases should be ‘valuable’ containing a relatively high output value; secondly, they should be 
‘accessible’ with many potential interviewees and large amounts of available secondary data; 
thirdly, they should be ‘typical’ i.e. should represent small-scale farmers; fourthly, they should 
enable exploration of the key elements proposed within the conceptual framework; and, finally 
they should each be different in terms of their respective market quality reputations (see Table 1 
below). Based on these criteria, three GI products were selected for study, namely the ‘Gannan 
navel orange’, ‘Nanfeng mandarin’ and ‘Wuyuan green tea’ 4 (Figure 2).  
 
 Gannan navel orange  Nanfeng mandarin Wuyuan green tea 
History  Short planting 
history  




Registered with the 
SAIC and the 
AQSIQ 
Registered with the 
SAIC, the AQSIQ, 
and the MoA 
Registered with the 
SAIC, the AQSIQ, and 
the MoA 
The existence of 
processors 
No No Yes 
Quality reputation Stable Decreasing Increasing 
Table 1: The key case study characteristics 
 
                                                        
4 Due to the different socio-economic environments in national and international markets and the very limited 
export quantity of the three products (only around 2.29% of Gannan navel oranges and 7.45% of Nanfeng 
mandarins were exported to international markets in 2009, and 12% of the annual output value of Wuyuan green 
tea was exported to international markets in 2010), the three case studies only focused on their respective national 
markets. 
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Figure 2: The study sites in Jiangxi province, China 
 
Empirical data was obtained through documentary research and semi-structured interviews. The 
secondary data was collected to prepare a picture of who the key actors involved in quality 
forming processes were within each GI network and also to build a context for each of the three 
case studies through publications, internet searching and preliminary research conducted with 
local government officers in Nanfeng county in January 2010, in the Ganzhou area in July 2010, 
and in Wuyuan county in October 2010. Based on the documentary research, face to face 
interviews with government officers, drafters of GI standards, managers of GI holders, farmers, 
processors and intermediaries, as well as managers of the contract farming system 5, were 
organised between October and December, 2010. Forty-three interviewees (14-15 interviewees in 
each case), selected in accordance with the snowball sampling method6, were asked to respond to 
a list of twenty semi-structured questions relating to GI regulations, quality standards in practice 
and the social, political and economic influences upon production activities. All data collected was 
                                                        
5 Individual consumers were not investigated as actors as they usually do not have a significant influence on 
producers’ production activities (Mulgan, 1989) and a representative consumer survey was beyond the scope of 
this research. Instead, middlemen were interviewed because of their knowledge of the consumer market. 
6 The snowball sampling method was used as many respondents are difficult to have a meeting with, such as 
processing firms’ managers and drafters of the GI standard. Initially, at least three government officers within each 
GI network were recommended mainly by four scholars at the two aforementioned Universities in Jiangxi province. 
Then, these government officers were contacted by telephone and asked whether they would like to participate in 
this research and whether they were able to contact other actors, such as technicians, farmers and middlemen. After 
obtaining positive answers, the investigation was conducted. In fact, not only government officers but every 
respondent was required to introduce more possible participants. 
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processed in three phases, namely transcription, classification, and connection utilising NVivo 8 to 
ensure reliability and ‘to be more explicit and reflective about the process of analysis’ (Bryman, 
2008, p.567). 
 
5. An examination of GIs influences in enhancing quality – three case studies  
5.1. Gannan navel orange 
 
Navel orange trees were first farmed commercially in the Gannan area in 1971. Since then, the 
local natural environment has proved to be ideal for producing navel oranges. In 2009, the annual 
production of navel oranges in the Gannan area reached 1.2 million tonnes, a figure only slightly 
less than outputs harvested in Brazil and Florida. In order to protect and promote navel oranges 
from the Gannan area and to increase local producers’ incomes, the AQSIQ issued Notice No. 136 
in 2004 to confirm that the Gannan navel orange would be protected as a GI product. In 2007, the 
trademark office of the SAIC also granted a certification mark to the Gannan navel orange with 
the support of the local government. Both AQSIQ and SAIC frameworks adopt ‘The National 
Standard: Product of geographical indication — Gannan navel orange’ (GB/T 20355-2006) 7, to 
define quality characteristics and regulate the production activities of Gannan navel oranges in the 
network.  
 
Reflecting contemporary Chinese consumers’ preference for shape and taste, more than 95% of 
Gannan navel oranges belong to the Newhall variant which is better for eating rather than for 
juicing. Most Gannan navel oranges are sold fresh at the market and their quality is greatly 
determined by farming activities within the context of locally specific natural environmental 
conditions. In principle, local farmers should cultivate their navel orange trees according to the 
national GI standard and only those navel oranges that meet the listed quality criteria should be 
sold as GI products. However, through examining the power relationships operating between 
various actors involved in the Gannan orange network, it became apparent that farmers’ 
production decisions are greatly influenced by the quality criteria proposed by the middlemen, 
                                                        
7 It is not proposed by producers’ co-operatives but different government departments with a government funded 
expert association. 
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rather than the national GI standard. In other words, the GI scheme has only a very limited impact 
on the actual farming activities and thus on the quality of Gannan navel oranges.  
 
Firstly, the GI holder of both GI frameworks, the Gannan Navel Orange Association (GNOA) has 
almost no impact on farmers’ activities. A government officer confirmed that the GNOA is formed 
by “government officers, farmers, and sellers” with the proclaimed aim being to manage the 
Gannan navel orange network through issuing GI labels, collecting information to help the local 
government adjust its policies, offering technical, legal, and marketing support for producers, and 
mediating disputes in the network (see also Gannan Navel Orange Association, 2005). However, 
as Chinese farmers were not encouraged to co-operate until 2006 when the ‘Law on Specialised 
Farmers Cooperatives’ was first issued, the knowledge as to how to co-operate is limited in this 
specific network. Also, as the GNOA is funded by and operates under local government 
requirements, the GNOA can only deal with issues described by a government officer, as ‘issues 
not suitable for government departments, such as applying for GIs’. The authority to issue GIs 
was transferred from the GNOA to the local Fruit Industry Bureau. Consequently, the GNOA is 
effectively rendered as powerless in the network and few participants could confirm its impact 
upon regulating production activities to ensure the specific quality characteristics of Gannan navel 
oranges. 
 
A second limiting issue is related to the GI issuing processes. In the national GI standard, the 
farming requirements and quality criteria8 of Gannan navel oranges are listed. The methods of 
choosing samples from a certain batch and checking appearance, physical contents, pollution level 
and net weight of samples are also specified. However, the production activities and final products 
are not effectively inspected to reflect “pre-set” GI standards in the network because the national 
GI standard is believed to be un-enforceable by the local government. As a government officer 
reported: 
 
‘…the national standard is only a guideline’  
                                                        
8 The quality of Gannan navel oranges can be evaluated officially with reference to four aspects: appearance, 
physical contents (related to the taste aspect), pollution-free (related to the safety aspect), and net weight. 
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Accordingly, there is a potential disconnect between the GI issuing stage and the quality checking 
stage based on the national GI standard. Indeed, when questioned further, it became apparent that 
GI applicants are simply asked to fill out an application form, hand it into the local Fruit Industry 
Bureau and then buy9 GI labels from the GNOA for one year. Inappropriate GI issuing procedures 
combined with the absence of an inspection programme was recognised quickly by farmers as a 
signal that producing navel oranges according to the national GI standard was not strictly enforced; 
rather they could sell their products with a GI label but without having to adhere consistently to 
the pre-set standards. 
 
Without effective co-operative behaviour within the GNOA and an appropriate government 
inspection programme, middlemen inevitably play a critical role in this network especially when 
more than 80% of local farmers10 sell their navel oranges into the market through middlemen in 
order to reduce the selling cost. In contrast to GI schemes controlled by the local government, 
middlemen’s ‘purchasing power’ has shown a significant influence on farming activities through 
proposed quality criteria which concentrate on the appearance rather than taste or undetectable 
safety aspects. For example, good taste is believed to be a definite quality characteristic of Gannan 
navel oranges and thus a minimum expected criteria for middlemen. One commented that: 
 
‘…the taste of Gannan navel oranges is always better than navel oranges from other areas due to 
the natural local environment and so consumers prefer to buy and pay a higher price for the 
‘Gannan navel orange’. For me, all navel oranges I purchase from the Gannan area can be sold 
in the market because of its good taste and so taste is given and not a critical purchasing standard 
for me’ 
 
In such circumstance, the quality paradox commences. Even though farmers announced that taste 
is critical to evaluate the quality of navel oranges and everybody likes tasty oranges, farmers focus 
on decreasing inputs on taste as taste alone cannot bring any extra income to them. A farmer 
                                                        
9 ‘… 0.006 RMB for an orange label and 0.1 RMB for a package label’ according to a government officer. 
10 Their farm size is usually less than 0.7 ha. 
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explained, 
 
‘If you mention taste, I would like to say, I do not have any incentive to improve quality at all 
because only a few buyers pay a higher price for better taste. … Even though some buyers pay a 
higher price for better taste, compared with the associated extra inputs, such as using organic 
fertilisers instead of chemical ones … I cannot get a fair profit at all’ 
 
Clearly, under limited organisational effectiveness and weak government enforcement, the quality 
of Gannan navel oranges is presented into the market reflecting economic rationality rather than 
the national GI standard, although quality developing processes are not just impacted by 
middlemen’s preferences alone but also by many other factors such as the natural environment, the 
farm’s size and the cultivation experience. The significant ‘purchasing power’ of middlemen 
makes them ‘powerful’ actors in the network where a decreasing emphasis upon taste and product 
safety are common choices for local farmers. Consequently, although all interviewees believed GI 
labels have the potential to help producers and sellers obtain a high economic reward due to 
Chinese consumers’ traditional preferences for GI products, consumers’ willingness to pay for 
Gannan navel oranges is actually decreasing as the market price slipped from 2.7 RMB per KG in 
2005 to less than 2 RMB per KG in 2009. Consequently, the middlemen interviewed preferred to 
establish their own trademarks. Moreover, some counties in the Gannan area, which can produce 
navel oranges with a better taste than other counties under excellent natural conditions, have 
started to register and promoted their own collective/certification marks, such as Sanbaishan, 
Xinfeng navel orange and Anyuan navel orange, in order to help local farmers obtain relatively 
high economic rewards in the market. 
 
5.2. Nanfeng mandarins 
 
The second case, the Nanfeng mandarin case, illustrates a completely different socio-economic 
environment compared to the Gannan navel orange network. Firstly, culture and tradition have a 
strong influence as Nanfeng mandarin trees have been farmed for more than 1,300 years and the 
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associated traditions continue with local farmers preferring to sell their products individually 
rather than through middlemen. Secondly, the government of Fuzhou City within which Nanfeng 
County resides, has permitted the expansion of mandarin cultivation to unprotected counties since 
2007, unlike the Ganzhou government which limited the growing area of Gannan navel oranges to 
the specified GI protection area. An explanation for this is the third major difference, notably the 
importance of the product to the local economy. The Gannan navel orange network contributed 
less than 1% to local government income in 2010 but more than a third of Nanfeng County’s GDP 
is generated by the Nanfeng mandarin network. However, based on the data collected, despite the 
clear contextual differences between the Gannan navel orange and the Nanfeng mandarin network, 
the power relationships involved in the quality construction process of Nanfeng mandarins were 
not dissimilar to those in the Gannan navel orange case. Again, in the face of inappropriate GI 
issuing processes and weak government inspection programmes, local farmers11 preferred to make 
their production decisions based upon economic rationality within the context of local natural and 
culture conditions.  
 
Firstly, the specific influence of co-operatives upon farming activities and thus quality cannot be 
observed in this network. The Nanfeng mandarin has been registered with each of the three 
Chinese GI frameworks in 1998, 2003 and 2010 through the application of different co-operatives 
with the support of the local government. However, these co-operatives have little impact on 
regulating production activities for many reasons. For instance, the Nanfeng Mandarin Association 
(NMA), comprising of technical officers, suppliers (pesticide, fertiliser, machine and plantlets 
sellers), farmers, and middlemen, was formed with the support of the local government to apply 
the GI with the MoA. But in the face of local specific culture that most local farmers prefer to 
produce and sell their products individually, without the authority to issue GI labels and ‘with little 
financial funds available from the government and few officers’ (a government officer), the 
responsibilities of the NMA are little more than ‘sending two notices to each village per year to 
help farmers cultivate their mandarin trees in a more scientific way’ and trying to co-ordinate 
Association members to ‘investigate different villages twice per year normally relating to 
                                                        
11 The farmer is still the sole producer in this network as Nanfeng mandarins are unsuitable for making juice due 
to their small size and lack of sweetness.  
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technique issues’ (a technician). The NMA was thus described by the interviewees as little more 
than a ‘government branch’ with little influence upon quality. 
 
Secondly, inappropriate GI issuing procedures decrease the incentive for farmers to regulate their 
own production activities and ensure the quality of their products reflects the national GI standard. 
Within the network, all GI frameworks adopt ‘The National Standard: Product of geographic 
indication — Nanfeng mandarin’ (GB/T 19051-2008)12 to define the quality characteristics of 
Nanfeng mandarins, identify the quality standards and specify the production codes. However, 
farmers interviewed showed little knowledge of the national standard and indicated that they can 
get GI labels for free13 without application or being subject to any prior quality checking stages. 
Government officers and technicians explained that this occurs because the quality characteristics 
are defined too flexibly in the national standard as part of their rural development projects, natural 
factors rather than production codes have a greater impact upon certain quality characteristics such 
as taste and appearance, and the financial input which the national standard requires to enhance 
quality is unaffordable for most small-scale farmers. As one government officer said, ‘in the face 
of the rapid expansion of the planting area and the quickly changing genetic properties of 
plantlets, the local government had little choice but to define the quality characteristics of the 
Nanfeng mandarin very flexibly so as to ensure that all local mandarins producers are able to 
benefit from the GI system’.  
 
Thirdly, the national standard is again believed to be unenforceable because of an inappropriate 
government policy. Whilst the cultivation area of the Nanfeng mandarin is theoretically limited ‘to 
the protected area (i.e Nanfeng County)’ in the national standard, as mentioned earlier, the Fuzhou 
government allows all ten counties governed by Fuzhou city to produce Nanfeng mandarins to 
enhance farmers’ income levels. A technician noted the creativity of the Fuzhou government who 
‘announced that the Nanfeng mandarin was a variety rather than a GI product’ thereby negating 
the possibility of the national standard being fully adopted.   
                                                        
12 This national GI standard was written by several government officers who come from the Jiangxi Provincial 
Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, the Fuzhou City Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, the 
Nanfeng County Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision and the Nanfeng Mandarin Industrial Bureau. 
13 The government officers send GI labels to different villages and farmers can use as many as they like. 
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Under creatively interpreted GI standards and weak government inspection programmes, farmers 
prefer to make their production decisions based on economic rationality with respect to their 
inputs and anticipated future incomes. Products are thus presented to the market with varying 
quality characteristics reflecting the ‘purchasing power’ of different mandarin buyers.  
 
More than 70% of the annual mandarin output is sold to final consumers by small-scale farmers 
individually reflecting the long standing prevailing culture with a further 20% sold to 54 trading 
companies and with a further 5% of output sold to contract farming companies. The rise of 
contract farming is perceived as a means of enhancing quality because farmers now adjust their 
farming activities to the requirements of the contracting company with the incentive of benefitting 
from a price which is 20-30% higher than the average market price. However, the effectiveness of 
these contracted companies in enhancing the overall quality of ‘Nanfeng mandarins’ remains 
minimal because only a small proportion of farmers benefit directly and contracted companies 
prefer to sell their products under their own brand labels to avoid the reputational risk associated 
with using GI labels.  
 
Given the expansion in production since 2007 stimulated by the Fuzhou government’s policy, it is 
little surprise to note that the market price decreased from 3.2 RMB per KG in 2006 to 1.8 RMB 
per KG in 2009. Consequently, farmers from the less traditional growing area14 have refused to 
change their production activities. As a farmer indicated, 
 
‘I never water my mandarin trees … no matter what I do, the quality of my mandarins is always 
not as good as mandarins from certain areas…quality can be partly improved by increasing the 
input, but, I do not know whether the increased cost can be covered by my future income’   
 
Only farmers located in the traditional growing area have the incentive to improve the taste level 
                                                        
14 The ideal cultivation region of Nanfeng mandarin is around the town (the traditional growing area). The 
expansion of the cultivation area not only increases the quantity supplied but also changes the unique quality 
characteristics such as the taste and the appearance of Nanfeng mandarins. 
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of their products through increasing inputs based on predictable specific consumers’ preferences15. 
A farmer explained, 
 
‘I prefer to improve the taste of my products, such as by using organic fertilisers. There are a lot of 
local consumers who prefer to pay a high price for my products because they know the taste of my 
products is great. Even if my price was double or triple the average market price, all of my 
mandarins would be sold very quickly each year’  
 
With ineffective co-operatives, ‘low’ quality criteria, inappropriate GI issuing procedures and 
creative interpretations of the national standard, GI schemes are perceived as unable to change 
farming activities and thus enhance quality in the network. Such problems further reduce the 
appeal of GI labels to the extent that some farmers refuse to apply GI labels onto their products 
because in the word of one farmer‘…everybody can use them to show their mandarins are 
Nanfeng mandarins even for those mandarins from other counties. It is totally meaningless!’ 
Local farmers thus prefer to make their production decisions primarily under financial rather than 
GI standards based considerations. Combined with various local natural conditions, individual 
selling culture and specific policies issued by the Fuzhou government, Nanfeng mandarins with 
varying quality characteristics are finally presented into the market. 
 
5.3. Wuyuan green tea 
 
The previous two case studies demonstrated how ineffective GI schemes were in enhancing 
agrifood quality primarily because GI holders and inspectors were too weak in the existing power 
relationships to effect meaningful change. It is always the ‘powerful’ buyers who determine 
quality characteristics through the adjustment of producers’ production activities. However, this 
research also demonstrates that context has a strong impact upon the quality construction process 
and that not all GI networks are the same. A third case study, Wuyuan green tea, thus casts further 
light on the importance of context and network structure.  
                                                        
15 It is difficult for individual consumers to judge the safety level of mandarins and the preference of consumers 
on the appearance is always changing; the only predictable consumer preference here refers to the taste. 
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Given that fresh tea shoots and leaves have to be processed before selling, processors are critical 
actors in the quality forming processes in this network unlike the other two cases of oranges and 
mandarins, although some farmers still process tea products by hand16 or by hiring processing 
machines. Also, unlike the other two networks, a long co-operative culture between producers and 
sellers in the Wuyuan green tea network may enhance the influence of co-operation upon quality. 
With these differentiations in the context and network structure, following an examination of the 
power relationships involved in the quality forming processes, however, the findings again 
indicate that the impact of the GI scheme on quality is quite limited.  
 
Firstly, with the support from the local government, Wuyuan green tea was registered as a GI 
product with all the three GI frameworks in 2005, 2008 and 2010 although a national standard for 
Wuyuan green tea was not issued until 2012 partly due to a lack of scientific research data. As a 
government officer noted, 
 
‘Only certain aspects, such as water and ash content levels, can be checked in the county’s 
laboratories. But important quality characteristics used to grade Wuyuan green tea products still 
can be only judged by personal experience. It is even impossible to distinguish the green tea 
products produced in Wuyuan county or neighbouring counties by laboratory tests’  
  
A lack of national GI standards has encouraged all GI applicators - the Wuyuan County Tea 
Association (WCTA), the Tea Industry Centre, and the Wuyuan County Tea Technology 
Promotion Center - which are funded and managed by the local government with the purpose of 
increasing local farmers’ incomes, to propose different but ‘basic’ GI standards. For instance, the 
WCTA, originally made up of twenty-one members - three government officers, sixteen 
processing or trading company managers, one technician, and one teacher from the local tea 
school - was established to apply for the certification mark of ‘Wuyuan green tea’ in 2005. 
                                                        
16 According to Xun et al. (2010), only 2% farmers still process green tea products by hand in a village located in 
Wuyuan county. 
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Managed by the local tea bureau17, it issued “The Measurements of the Certification Trademark of 
Wuyuan Green Tea” to operate the GI issuing procedure. According to The Measurements, the 
WCTA is authorised to check 15 green tea indices such as the moisture, ash, power, lead, copper, 
DDT and methamidophos content of the GI applicant’s samples. If the samples can pass the 
examinations, have been processed through “fixation”, “rolling” and “drying”, the three 
processing steps, and contain “no other contents, no strange smell, no visible red branch, have a 
good taste and smell, soft green leaves and a fresh green colour”, then the applicant can obtain the 
certification trademark on their package for a period of three years after paying a management fee. 
However, whilst all 15 indices are similar to the national mandatory standards for green tea 
products18 and many words, such as smell and taste are poorly defined, it is not difficult for an 
applicant to obtain GI labels from the WCTA especially when the samples are provided by the 
applicants themselves. The specific impact of GI standards and the WCTA on production activities 
and quality was thus difficult to find from respondents’ comments. 
 
Secondly, within the Chinese GI schemes, the SAIC, the AQSIQ and the MoA are responsible for 
ensuring the adoption of GI standards in the network. They are quality inspectors but the conflict 
between different standards and the difficulty in inspecting farmers’ production activities due to ‘a 
lack of officers’ and ‘small quantity production’ reduce their impact. As a government officer 
explained, 
 
‘… for individual farmers, I have to admit that these laws and standards are not very useful, 
especially for farmers who process green tea products by themselves. It is easy for government to 
regulate companies’ activities rather than individual farmers. No punishment is available for 
farmers, even if they break the law such as using forbidden pesticides, the government can do 
nothing. … Normally, they are very poor and the government thus cannot take their property. Also, 
according to the laws, the government cannot put them into jail due to the small production 
quantity’ 
                                                        
17 The government officers who are members of the association manage the association for the bureau. Thus, the 
WCTA is in reality a ‘sub-organisation of the local tea bureau’ (a government officer). 
18 Ash level content is 7%, 0.5% less than the national mandatory standards; everything else is the same. 
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Therefore, local farmers prefer to make their production decisions mainly based on economic 
rationality rather than GI standards. The local government (through offering subsidies), processors 
(the fresh tea shoots and leaves buyer) and middlemen (the processed green tea product buyer) are 
becoming the dominant players in the quality forming processes. For instance, local government 
offers various free tea plantlets and encourages farmers to upgrade their tea farms through the use 
of subsidies. One processor commented, 
 
‘… upgrading tea farms focuses on using organic fertilisers and controlling the planting density. 
Both are critical to produce organic green tea products which can be sold with a high price in the 
market. Stimulated by the government subsidies and future high incomes, farmers prefer to 
upgrade their farms’ 
 
When some farmers began to sell their fresh tea shoots and leaves to contracted processors, these 
farmers agreed to produce their products according to the processors’ specified production and 
quality criteria, in order to obtain the promised higher income. As a government officer described, 
 
‘The contract regulates farmers’ activities and indicates the quality standards that fresh tea 
shoots and leaves have to meet. If a farmer’s products can pass all the examinations and be 
certified as organic shoots or leaves, the processor will pay an extra 30%-50% premium to the 
farmer. The contract not only protects processors’ right to have a quality input but also brings 
high economic reward for farmers’ 
 
As farmers’ production activities are greatly influenced by financial returns, the farmers who sell 
processed green tea products to middlemen accordingly shift their quality focus to the detectable 
characteristics such as taste and appearance rather than unobservable attributes associated with 
safety and hygiene. For example, a middleman specified that many farmers grade tea shoots 
accordingly ‘shoots, shoots with one leaf, shoots with two leaves, and shoots with three leaves’ as 
these reflect the preferences of the buyer and the prices paid by them. 
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Compared to farmers who make production decisions solely under financial consideration, 
processors’ production decisions are more complex and are co-impacted by both local government 
and large-scale buyers. A processor commented that government inspection programmes run ‘two 
or three times per year’ and, in the words of one government officer, “processors … have to 
ensure their products meet relevant requirements or they will be punished” with “the payment of 
a fine” or “cease running for a while”. Processors thus have to observe the compulsory laws, 
national regulations and standards (rather than the GI standards due to the conflict between 
different standards issued by different GI frameworks). In addition, as processors deal with 
large-scale buyers, they are forced to concentrate on key attributes such as taste, appearance and 
the safety aspect to produce green tea products. As a processor announced,  
 
“[M]y consumers have special requirements for green tea products. I have to meet their 
requirements …The taste, smell, appearance, contents and safety aspects all have to be examined”  
 
To summarise, the quality development process is more complex in the Wuyuan green tea network 
compared to the other two cases because additional actors are involved. However, the findings are 
not dissimilar to the other cases in the sense that GI schemes have not achieved the expected 
regulatory impact and it is economic rationality which primarily governs the quality construction 
process in this network. In the face of inappropriate GI issuing processes, most interviewees 
believe that the GI is a type of promotion or marketing technique rather than a quality certification 
mark and that the increasing market price of Wuyuan green tea is the combined result of local 
government promotion and their associated tea programmes through offering free plantlets and 




The paper set out to evaluate the effectiveness of GI schemes in terms of enhancing agrifood 
quality with a focus on Jiangxi province, China. The results indicate that the quality of agrifood 
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products is not being enhanced by GI schemes as currently implemented in these cases.  
 
Through examining power relationships involved in quality construction processes within three GI 
networks, the problems existing at national and local scales are highlighted in this research. At the 
national scale, the co-existence of three parallel GI frameworks is problematic because the 
overlapping responsibility for inspection and the inherent conflicts limit the ability (‘power’) of 
the government to regulate production activities based on GI standards. In addition, research from 
the United States and the European Union (e.g. Hayes et al., 2004; O’Reilly and Haines, 2004) has 
indicated that the quality of GI products can be enhanced by three independent elements in the 
regulatory chain - the ‘legislator’ with its emphasis upon GI standards, the ‘executor’ with its GI 
issuing procedures, and the ‘judiciary’ through its inspection programmes. For example, the Cassis 
Syndicate and the Parma Ham Consortium ensure product quality through strict GI production 
codes (developed by producer co-operatives) and specific control systems (the INOA in the Cassis 
wine network and the IPQ in the Parma ham network). The reality is rather different in China, 
however, as all these functions are embedded within government or government supported 
organisations without the necessary independence associated with European and American GI 
systems. Motivated primarily by a concern to improve farming incomes, the government or its 
agencies propose ‘basic’ GI standards, adopt lax GI issuing procedures, and manage weak 
inspection programmes to ensure all local producers can take advantage of the GI system but with 
the result that GIs do not stimulate product quality improvements currently. Developing 
appropriate governance mechanisms thus must be addressed as a pre-condition for enhancing 
agrifood quality within the GI system. 
 
At the local or provincial level, the case studies demonstrate that the most relevant influence upon 
current quality forming processes is the nature of the economic relationships between different 
actors within various contexts. In other words, it is the commercial financial aspect that mostly 
determines producers’ production activities and thus their quality choice decisions. In each case 
studied, under lax market supervision, producers prefer to respond to actors who are able to exert 
influence on specific quality characteristics based on their buying power. As a consequence, the 
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quality characteristics of the examined GI products are not very stable. This is different from 
many western GI agrifood products, where the quality characteristics are defined by strict GI 
codes and relate mainly to criteria such as taste, heritage, production conditions and processes, all 
of which in turn are linked to defined geographical locations. If the GI labels are not able to 
guarantee specific quality characteristics, the consumer will refuse to pay a high price for such GI 
labeled products, as witnessed by the Gannan navel orange and the Nanfeng mandarin cases. This 
emerging ‘lemon market’ is completely different from the original perspective of the Chinese 
government and demonstrates that believing GI schemes alone can encourage or establish quality 
agrifood products for consumers and thus bring higher economic rewards to local producers is far 
too simplistic and arbitrary, as some European investigations (e.g. Dimara et al., 2004; Sepúlveda 
et al. 2010; Adinolfi et al., 2011; Teuber, 2011) have also proved. Compared to other countries’ 
rural development experience (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1999; van der Ploeg et al., 2000; Tregear et. 
al., 2007; Overton and Heitger, 2008), the Chinese government needs to be aware of the danger of 
bureaucracy and yet at the same time must not be too narrow in their approach towards 
simplifying GI standards and the GI issuing procedure as part of its rural development projects. 
 
Undoubtedly, given the existence of a dearth of research presently in China, further in-depth 
investigation is still required in order to reach a more detailed understanding of the constraints 
upon the effectiveness of Chinese GI schemes. Inevitably, further studies on different GI products 
such as chicken, fish or wine from different provinces and a representative consumer survey will 
generate additional streams of useful research (see also Goodman, 2003; Zhao, 2007; Kneafsey et 
al., 2008). It would also be interesting to contrast the quality development processes of GI 
agrifood products destined for the national and the international markets to see whether there are 
significant differences in assuring quality under different government policies and inspection 
programmes. This paper is one contribution to this ongoing debate. 
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